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WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND LATIN
AMERICA INTEGRATION: MERCOSUR
AND THE ROAD TO REGIONAL
INCONSISTENCIES-To WHERE ARE
WE GOING EXACTLY?
Marcos Aurglio Pereira Valaddo*
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS paper is an attempt to make connections between the Wash-
ington Consensus and the current phase of the Latin America
(LA) integration process, considering especially the Common
Market of the South (MERCOSUR) region. It will address the origins of
the present state of things under a historic, economic, and legal perspec-
tive, taking into consideration how the Washington Consensus policies
affected Latin American countries, the differences between the countries,
and how their societies and governments reacted to it. Additionally, the
paper will focus on regional integration, specifically for the countries of
the MERCOSUR block. It seeks to demonstrate that the Washington
Consensus1 policies, as applied to Latin American countries, had political
outcomes and redirected the integration process, which includes
MERCOSUR, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the
Andean Community (CAN).
Marcos Aurelio Pereira Valadao, Professor of Law (Universidade Catolica de
Brasilia School of Law, Brazil); S.J.D. (SMU), L.L.M. (UnB, Brazil), LL.M. Inter-
national and Comparative Law (SMU), LL.B. (UCG, Brazil), MBA (IBMEC, Bra-
zil), B.S. (UnB, Brazil). Contact: mvaladao@ mail.smu.edu or profvaladao@yahoo.
com.br.
1. The term "Washington Consensus" was first used by John Williamson to describe a
set of policies that would be consensus within the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries to be applied to Latin America in
order to adjust their economies. Williamson first developed these ideas in 1989.
See John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus (2004), Paper
commissioned by Fundaci6n CIDOB for a conference From the Washington Con-
sensus towards a new Global Governance, Barcelona, (September 24-25, 2004),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson094-2.pdf. The pol-
icies of the Washington Consensus are deemed to be the core of neoliberal public
policies, the so-called "neoliberalism."
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II. THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AS A COMMON FACTOR
TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA,
MERCOSUR, AND FTAA
A. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
What does the Washington Consensus have to do with the current state
of affairs in Latin America? There are some main points that will be
stressed in this article. Let's move back nineteen years, when the Wash-
ington Consensus recommendations were first established. 2
In the early 1980s, Latin America was just recovering from a long pe-
riod of dictatorships, at least in the most important countries. Of these,
several countries' economies were not stabilized, still damaged by the oil
crisis of the seventies that induced huge external debts (except for Vene-
zuela and Mexico). 3 There were also serious problems in applying the
"rule of law,"' 4 this claim would surface in the mid 1980s and grew
2. The recommendations are:
Fiscal policy discipline;
Redirection of public spending from subsidies toward broad-based provi-
sion of key pro-growth;
Tax reform - broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal
tax rates;
Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in
real terms;
Competitive exchange rates;
Trade liberalization -any trade protection to be provided by low and rel-
atively uniform tariffs;
Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;
Privatization of state enterprises;
Deregulation-abolition of regulations that impede market entry or re-
strict competition; Legal security for property rights.
Id. at 3-4.
3. Due to Mexico's economic interdependence and physical proximity to the United
States, this Latin American country has a different experience in comparison to
other LA countries regarding integration to the United States. See generally
Pamela K. Starr, Neither Populism Nor the Rule of Law: The Future of Market
Reform in Mexico, Paper presented at Conference Trade Integration in the Ameri-
cas: Revisiting the Washington Consensus-Legal and Institutional Aspects of Re-
form (April, 2008), available at http://smu.edu/tower/SMU%20conference%20
paper%20Mar08.pdf.
4. As confessed by Dani Rodrik, what "rule of law" really means is unclear. Accord-
ingly, the World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators project) uses more than
sixty parameters to measure the rule of law grade. See Economics and the Rule of
Law: Order in the Jungle, ECONOMIST (2008), available at http://www.economist.
comlfinance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=10849115 (last visited September 21, 2008).
Of course, the World Bank measure is far from being precise, not only because the
measure of each parameter can be flawed, but mostly because the concept of rule
of law itself is blurry. Note, however, one may say that there is a hard set of
characteristics that indicates effectiveness or failure in implementing the rule of
law. At the end of the day, rule of law means the existence of a transparent legal
framework in a country and the effectiveness of this system. If one considers this
simple definition in a single country, and disregards moral and cultural issues, then
the concept seems acceptable. On the other hand, if one brings to the concept the
international environment that all countries are subject to, and considers also
moral values (in this sense democracy is to be deemed a moral value), then the
statement above is only a small part of the concept as a whole. This approach is
similar to the thick and thin definitions of rule of law. The first type of definitions
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stronger into the 1990s. 5 The rule of law approach, along with the Wash-
ington Consensus recommendations, was considered the final recipe for
development. Indeed, legal security for property rights (one of the Wash-
ington Consensus recommendations) is one of the pillars of the rule of
law concept. While there is not room here to go through the multiple
theories on law and development, it is worth pointing out that the current
approach replaced development theories and strategies that were cen-
tered in other types of economic measures6 that did not consider legal
and institutional issues as part of their core solutions.7
If one analyzes the decade of the 1990s, one will see that roughly all
countries in the Central and South Americas adopted almost all ten
Washington Consensus recommendations. As it was put by Carlos
Blanco:
National governments are also constrained increasingly by interna-
tional institutions. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean,
especially, organizations such as the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, along with the U.S. Treasury, have obliged au-
thorities to adopt fiscal and monetary policies that reflect the view-
point of the "Washington Consensus"; at least they must adhere to
these policies if they wish to receive economic assistance. During the
1990s, severe institutional adjustments were imposed on economies
throughout the region without considering how they might affect
governability. As a result, nation-states and citizens were challenged
by new conflicts reflecting demands, needs, and possibilities
originated in the international arena.8
In some counties, like Argentina, the recommendations were a disas-
ter. In others, like Brazil, it was satisfactory or "radically" satisfactory,
like in Chile. There were, however, other issues. Despite economic
assumes the rule of law as encompassing liberty, democracy, justice, and other
moral values, and the latter being more formal, centered in property rights and the
efficient administration of justice. See id.
5. Id.; See also David M. Trubek on the rule of law approach to fostering develop-
ment, considering when the idea came out and how it has been increasing in im-
portance since then. Trubek affirms that the legal orthodoxy that is found within
the Washington Consensus policies now tends to be more fluid (maybe a trend to a
general acceptance of the thick definition of rule of law). DAVID M. TRUBEK, THE
"RULE OF LAW" IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, IN
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL74-94, 93-
94 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006).
6. Until the 1980s, Latin America had been dominated by an economic policy known
as import substitution industrialization (ISI), where state action was considered to
be essential for development through protectionist state policies and direct action
(state-owned enterprises) in heavy industry and utilities. See Douglas S. Massey et
al., Introduction: Of Myths and Markets, 606 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc.
ScI. 276, 276 (2006). This strategy did not generate development as it was ex-
pected due to set of factors (internal and external). Id.
7. See Trubek, supra note 5, at 74-84.
8. Carlos Blanco, Reform of the State: An Alternative for Change in Latin America,
606 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 231, 233 (2006).
210 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 15
growth from 1990 to 2000 for the countries of the region,9 circa 2000-
2001, each of these three countries experienced a different outcome. Bra-
zil had one of the most irrational wealth distribution levels compared to
all other nations of the world. Argentina was literally broke, and Chile
was leaving a period of state absence where public services were highly
privatized. But there is a negative common factor: on average, Latin
American countries have the worst wealth and income distribution in
comparison to other regions, despite the fact that Latin America is not
the poorest region of the Globe.10 These figures are a consequence of
unorthodox economic policies allied with public polices to restrain public
social expenditures.1"
Since then, left-wing political parties started to win elections in these
countries' 2 and reactions against U.S. non-cooperation with social and
9. ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: HISTORICAL STATISTICS, Vol. 2, 510-
528 (2006).
10. This statement considers the Gini coefficient, which is the common measure for
wealth distribution. In 2006, despite the fact that some Sub-Saharan countries had
the worst wealth distribution, Latin America, in comparison to other regions, in-
cluding Sub-Saharan countries, had the worst average wealth distribution, which
means a higher Gini coefficient, meaning greater difference between the poor and
the rich layers of society (the other regions or country blocks are South Asia, East
Asia and Pacific, Middle East and north Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
and OECD). See Carlos Marx Carrasco, La aceptaci6n social y la legitimidad de
las contribuciones fiscales sociales: el pacto fiscal, presentation at international
seminar Pacto Social, Pacto Fiscal: Miradas Cruzadas Uni6n Europea - Amirica
Latina, (Paris 29 - 31, Oct., 2007), available at http://www.eurosocialfiscal.org/
uploads/documentos/20080110_120118_EcoCarrascoParis.pdf. If one takes the
ratio of income/consumption of the top decile and the bottom decile, and considers
the worst twenty counties in the world, twelve out of these twenty countries are
Latin American and Caribbean countries (they are: Bolivia, Paraguay, Haiti, Co-
lombia, Brasil, El Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Chile Argentina
and Honduras, from the worst to the "better"). See also Bob Sutcliffe, Post-
script,World Inequality and Globalization (Table 5), 20 OXF. REV. ECON. POL. 15-
37 (Spring 2004), (using data from World Development Indicators 2006), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/PSBSutcliffe.pdf.
11. Leroy affirms that under an ideological plan, the Washington Consensus policies
placement of high importance on public debt payment will provoke, in terms of
expenditure in relation to Gross Domestic Product, a decrease or stagnation of
public expenses with education, and paradoxically an increase in the interest rate
applied to public debt. Thus, globalization decreases the welfare state by decreas-
ing social expenditure. See MARC LEROY, REFLEXION SOCIOLOGIQUE SUR LA
GLOBALIZATION FISCALE, in Mondialisation et Fiscalit& La Globalisation Fiscale
263, 278-279 (Marc Leroy ed., Paris, 2006) (Original in French). In general, for
poor countries, reducing social expenditures increases inequality.
12. It would also happen in other countries of the region. Most of the recent elected
presidents of important Latin American countries are from left-wing parties: Ar-
gentina (Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, 2003 and 2007, respectively), Brazil (Luis
Indcio Lula da Silva, 2002 and 2006), Bolivia (Evo Morales, 2006), Chile (Michelle
Bachelet, 2006), Equator (Rafael Correa, 2006), Uruguay (Tabar6 V~zquez, 2004),
Venezuela (Hugo Chavez, 2002), and more recently Paraguay (Fernando Lugo,
2008), and with some reservation Mexico (Vicente Fox, 2000). Some of these
countries were never ruled by a left-wing party. The link between inequality
(wealth and income distribution) and election results is an issue that has been the
object of much research. See, e.g., James K. Galbraith and Travis Hale, State In-
come Inequality and Presidential Election Turnout and Outcomes (UTIP, Working
Paper No. 33, 2006), available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/papers/utip-33.pdf.
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development policies driven by governments began. At this point Vene-
zuela comes tagging along. It is what the Washington consensus brought
to the region.
B. MERCOSUR AND FIAA
MERCOSUR was created in the early 1990s. It was established
through the Asunci6n Treaty (between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay), which entered into force in November 1991.13 The
MERCOSUR treaty was negotiated within the Latin American Integra-
tion Association treaty (LAIA) (created in 1980 with eleven members:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). 14 LAIA is ruled by a flexible integration
treaty which allows arrangements such as MERCOSUR. LAIA replaced
the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 15 that had been
established in 1960 by the same eleven LAIA members. LAFTA was an
inflexible integration treaty, and would not allow such internal arrange-
ments, which was the reason LAFTA perished.
Due to crucial political changes, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coun-
tries like Brazil and Argentina had to approve new Constitutions (e.g.,
Brazil in 1988, Argentina in 1994, Paraguay in 1992, and Chile reformed
its 1980 Constitution in 1989). It was expected that Latin American coun-
tries would enter into an era of prosperity. But there was a devastating
problem: economic instability, short-term cycles of hyperinflation and re-
cession, or both at the same time. These factors contributed to countries
increasing their public debts. Under this scenario, the Washington Con-
sensus and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported the coun-
tries in handling the endless state of crisis. With the IMF support came
conditionalities, which were very close to the Washington Consensus
recommendations. 16
13. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uraguay
(MERCOSUR), March 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1031[herinafter Treaty of Asunci6n].
14. Id.
15. LAIA is flexible, allowing an ample range of agreements between country mem-
bers and between members and nonmembers in the region and also easy access for
countries to join the block. There are few restrictions to third part agreements
with country members, except to trade treaties negotiated with developed coun-
tries. See Marcos Aurelio Pereira Valadfo, Mercosul e Unido Europgia: Um Es-
tudo Comparativo dos Sistemas Juridicos [Mercosur and European Union: A
Comparative Study of the Juridical Systems], (May, 1999), http://www.marcos-
valadao.pro.br/pdf/MERCOSULUNIAOEUROPEIA_% 20Sis_% 20jur.comp.
pdf (last visited September 21, 2008) (text in Portuguese).
16. See Teddy Chestnut & Anita Joseph, The IMF and the Washington Consensus: A
Misunderstood and Poorly Implemented Development Strategy, http://www.coha.
org/2005/07/17/the-imf-and-the-washington-consensus-a-misunderstood-and-
poorly-implemented-development-strategy/ (last visited September 21, 2008).
These commentators pointed out that:
Stiglitz's concerns were strikingly reflected in the experience of Latin
American IMF debtors. In relentless pursuit of the Consensus'
macroeconomic discipline, privatization and liberalization of trade and
capital markets, originally envisioned by Williams as a viable means to
promote healthy growth, the IMF tacked on coercive reformatory man-
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In the second half of the 1990s, MERCOSUR made remarkable pro-
gress. A customs union was created, with the MERCOSUR countries
applying the MERCOSUR Common External Tariff to all non-member
countries (which entered into force in 1995). Some MERCOSUR institu-
tions were created, and protocols were signed to allow a formal structure
to become operative in order to solve problems regarding rules of origin
and similar trade issues. The block, however, would not develop trade
integration like it was expected to.
Amidst the confusion of the 1990s, the Free Trade of the Americas
(FTAA) was approved by the majority of countries of the Americas
(1994). In the Summit of the Americas, which was held in December
1994 in Miami, Florida, American countries decided to join efforts to con-
nect the economies of the Americas into a single free trade zone.17 The
Heads of State and Government of thirty-four democratic countries of
the region agreed to construct the FTAA, in which barriers to trade and
investment should be progressively eliminated. The countries' ministers
responsible for trade were, at that time, responsible for initiating a series
of concrete steps to achieve the Free Trade Area of the Americas.18 The
plan was to accomplish significant progress toward building the IFTAA by
2000 and to finish negotiations of this agreement by 2005.19
Some scholars have seen the implementation of the Washington Con-
sensus policies and the FTAA (which is highly asymmetric if one consid-
ers the United States and Latin American economies as one) as a new
form of political and economic hegemony in the region. 20 This point of
view was widely assumed by left-wing parties and nationalist
conservatives.
dates to its loans without regard for the individual circumstances of the
debtor country. The Washington Consensus' principles became the con-
ditions without which the IMF would withhold funding. As such, the IMF
forced central banks to steeply raise interest rates, stripped states of their
enterprises, recklessly opened the floodgates to foreign capital and
slashed protectionist tariffs, pushing Latin American economies into cri-
sis one by one.
Id.
17. Actually, the FTAA negotiations formally started at the Second Summit of the
Americas in Santiago, Chile, on April, 1998. Mario E. Carranza says that:
The FTAA was originally conceived as an extension of the NAFTA
model to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. However, the inability of
President Clinton to obtain "fast-track" authority from the U.S. Con-
gress and the victory of the Brazil/MERCOSUR position during the ne-
gotiations to negotiate from 1994 through 1998 eliminated the NAFTA
extension approach (also known as the hub-and-spokes model) and es-
tablished a more balanced format for the negotiations.
Mario E. Carranza, Latin American Perspective: Mercosur, the Free Trade Area of
the Americas, and the Future of U.S. Hegemony In Latin America, 27 FORDHAM
INY'L L.J. 1029, 1030 (2004).
18. Id.
19. The decisions regarding these actions are contained in the Miami Summit's Decla-
ration of Principles and Plan of Action documents. Information available at the
FTAA website, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View-e.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
20. See Mario E. Carranza, supra note 17, at 1030-41.
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It is worth mentioning that in the last decade of the twentieth century,
Latin America shifted from the negative trend that existed prior to the
creation of regional trade agreements, and that growth in trade of the
region was 10.8 percent (in present value terms), which considerably ex-
ceeded the world growth in trade of 6.6 percent during the same period.21
This was the state of affairs as we entered into the twenty-first century.
It is necessary to analyze how this situation developed since then.
III. FTAA, BILATERAL FTAS, AND THE VENEZUELA MOVE
One can mention that the aggressive way the United States moved to-
ward imposing the FTAA on South American countries, by signing bilat-
eral free trade agreements (FTAs) with countries in the region, resulted
in a series of unfortunate events to FTAA.22
The United States started to use its economic power to push Latin
American countries to sign bilateral free trade agreements when the
FTAA negotiations appeared to be unproductive. It seems the strategy
was (or is) to solve bilateral problems through FTAs with Latin American
countries and the most powerful economy on the block. The resulting
next step would then be easier because the needed adjustments and solu-
tions to problems would be more trouble-free. Chris Brummer's ideas
are in line with this position when he affirms that BILATERAL TREATIES
do not block future multilateral arrangements. 23
One may notice that U.S. strategy was based on a strong Washington
Consensus-styled position regarding free trade, and that the U.S. strategy
had different consequences to CAN and MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR
countries refrained from negotiations (although Paraguay and Uruguay
were pressured by the United States to sign bilateral FTAs). The reaction
of MERCOSUR was to delay the pace of FTAA negotiations and try to
21. 24. Robert A. Pastor, Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the
Old World for the New 124 (Institute for International Economics, 2001).
22. As it was put by Kevin J. Fandl: "[w]hile the United States' efforts to secure a
multilateral FTAA have failed, the United States may still be able to reassert its
power in the hemisphere through the signing of bilateral FrAs." Kevin J. Fandl,
Bilateral Agreements and Fair Trade Practices: A Policy Analysis of the Colombia-
U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (2006), 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 64, 73-74
(2007). See also id. at 77 and accompanying footnotes.
23. As it was put by Chris Brummer:
Unlike BILATERAL TREATIES, which, as nondiscriminatory arrange-
ments, are not designed to keep counterparties from signing future
agreements with other parties, regional treaties are at times exclusive ar-
rangements that prohibit signatories from independently concluding
commercial agreements with third parties. As a result, regional agree-
ments may obstruct bilateral treaty making and, in the process, prevent
members from maximizing their own welfare - as well as that of the re-
gion. This insight suggests that regional treaties hold implications for effi-
ciency in bilateral settings that are potentially as far reaching as
regionalism's impact on multilateral forums, where regional institutions
often stymie efforts to initiate broad global reforms.
Chris Brummer, The Ties That Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the
Future of Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1351-1352 (2007).
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strengthen the MERCOSUR regional integration processes. But within
the CAN (which used to consist of Chile, Colombia, Peru and Vene-
zuela), things did not work out the same way. CAN members Peru and
Colombia have signed bilateral FTAs with the United States. As a conse-
quence, but not for this the sole reason, Venezuela resigned from CAN
and adhered to MERCOSUR in 2006.24
There has been criticism of the U.S. strategy to build-up bilateral
agreements instead of forcing negotiations within the FTAA multilateral
agreement, but, in fact, negotiation of bilateral trade treaties with Central
and South American countries can really be a workable strategy to cir-
cumvent the FTAA process.25 These bilateral agreements, however, have
not been signed with Brazil and Argentina, the two biggest economies of
the south region.
There is no doubt that Brazil and Argentina are fundamental to the
process of achieving the FIAA's goals, and one can hypothesize that as
long as Brazil and Argentina are negotiating with the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) members under the FTAA proposal,
mainstream negotiations will be preserved. As a consequence, bilateral
FTAs, far from being discriminatory, may become paths to a large multi-
lateral agreement - the FFAA. By way of bilateral FTAs, the small dif-
ferences between the countries would be settled. This will pave the road
for the "big multilateral treaty" because those questions will no longer be
part of the whole negotiation. That is the reason why it is reasonable to
assume the bilateral trade treaties between the United States and Canada
with Latin and Caribbean countries are not seen as nuisances to the
FTAA integration process, but rather as shortcuts. 26 Bilateral FTAs,
however, have affected CAN and MERCOSUR, and were one of the rea-
sons that Venezuela abandoned CAN and joined MERCOSUR.
Considering President Chavez's actions and declarations, one may also
assume that there is a strong political motivation for Venezuela to join
24. Id. at 1380-1381. Chris Brummer pointed out that:
Venezuela's decision to leave the CAN for Mercosur was, as some jour-
nalists have suggested, far from naive. Founded in 1991 by the Treaty of
Asuncion, the customs union between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and
Paraguay moves over $ 150 billion in annual trade, compared to the
CAN's $ 9 billion. Even though, as mentioned above, CAN members
enjoy "associate member" status in Mercosur with certain trade benefits,
full membership in Mercosur is much more valuable to Venezuela than
membership in the CAN.
Id. at 1387.
25. See, e.g., Willard A. Workman, Senior Vice President, International, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tax, Finance, and Exports
of the House Committee on Small Business on "The Chilean Free Trade Agree-
ment: Opening Doors to South American Markets" on Behalf of the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.usibc.com/issues/
testimony/2003/030612workman.htm
26. Marcos VALADAO & Nara Galeb Porto, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, FTAA and Its
Effects in Federal Taxation of International Transactions Between the United States
and Brazil: A Comparative Study, 10 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 705, 739 (2004).
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MERCOSUR, a block that aggregates the two biggest and most influen-
tial economies of South America (Brazil and Argentina).
IV. BRAZIL AND U.S. TRADE RELATIONSHIP
Brazil is the most important economy in South America, with 50 per-
cent of the land mass, roughly 15 percent of the population, and roughly
50 percent of the gross internal product (GIP). As a comparison, Argen-
tina has roughly 20 percent, Venezuela 8 percent, and Chile 6 percent of
South Americas GIP.27 Brazil's trade relations with the United States,
however, are not privileged. Instead, the United States has adopted se-
lective tariffs against Brazil, which can be shown "by a comparison be-
tween Brazil's average nominal import tariff on the [twenty] top U.S.
global export products, which was 11.54 [percent] in 2002, and the aver-
age nominal U.S. import tariff on the [twenty] top Brazilian global export
products, which was 44.4 [percent] in 2002."28 The most affected items
are agricultural products and low-value-added manufactured products.
There is also protection through the use of non-tariff barriers such as an-
tidumping and countervailing measures. 2 9
Along with this regional situation, came the WTO negotiations stale-
mate which was provoked mainly by agricultural subsidies and treatment
of services discussions. Let's move on to these themes.
V. THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF THE FTAA AND THE LINK TO
THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURAL
SUBSIDIES AND SERVICES (GATS)
It has already been mentioned that negotiations regarding agricultural
products have hampered the pursuit of an FTAA agreement, and have
also been a problem within the WTO process. Developing and poor
countries that are generally cost effective in producing such goods fre-
quently find tariff barriers imposed by developed and rich countries.
When these tariffs are aligned with huge agricultural subsidies they create
false agricultural competition.
Another crucial point is service trade. Developing and poor countries
are service buyers; thus, to protect their markets, they want to tax service
imports. Conversely, rich countries do not. Developing countries also
have a vast array of services delivered by the government, and rich coun-
tries demand privatization. These two issues exist in FTAA and WTO
negotiations, and now one can say that they are linked forever. This
means that these issues will not be solved solely within the WTO or
27. Leandro Freitas Couto, 0 horizonte regional do Brasil e a construqco da Am6rica
do Sul 83 (1990-2005) (Brasflia UnB, 2006) (unpublished work, available at http://
bdtd.bce.unb.br/tedesimplificado/tde-busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=509 (text in
Portuguese).
28. Antonio de Moura Borges, The Brazilian Perspective on the FTAA, 10 L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 695, 701 (2004).
29. Id. at 699.
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FTAA. Rather, they are part of the global problem and, therefore, the
solution must be global; there is no space for an insulated FTAA settle-
ment on these issues. This is not pessimism, but realism.
A further factor impeding trade relations between South and North
America, which would allow a trade integration of the Americas, is the
negotiations between MERCOSUR and the European Union (EU).
MERCOSUR and the EU have been negotiating an inter-block trade
agreement since 1994, when they agreed to an Interregional Framework
Cooperation Agreement, which outlined broad proposals (negotiations
actually began in 1992 with an Interinstitutional Cooperation Agree-
ment).30 The negotiations did not develop as planned, but they were not
interrupted. There is also a stalemate similar to the one between Brazil
and FITAA (or MERCOSUR and FTAA), regarding subsidies, access to
the agricultural products market, and services (the EU requests liberali-
zation of MERCOSUR service markets). One can affirm that in this
case, MERCOSUR and EU negotiations are dependent upon WTO ne-
gotiations regarding the DOHA Round31 - any resemblance to
MERCOSUR and FTAA impasse is not a coincidence. The Andean
Community also has been negotiating trade agreements with the EU. In-
deed, CAN and EU are now discussing the third round of CAN-EU
negotiations.32
It is a fact that agricultural subsidies, quotas, tariffs, and service liberal-
ization are the issues that must be discussed and resolved if there is to be
hope of creating a more integrated world.
VI. MERCOSUR AND THE CHANGE OF THE INTEGRATION
PROCESS TO OTHER FIELDS
A. THE SYMBOLISM OF THE MERCOSUR PASSPORT
Brazil has adopted an official travel document (a new Passport, since
December, 2006), which is not exactly a Brazilian Passport, but a
MERCOSUR Passport. It is important to point this out because this doc-
ument is a sign that MERCOSUR integration is still on course. Even
though there is no substantial economic progress in the recent integration
process, there are other areas of integration that are in fact progressing.
One very important feature of the MERCOSUR passport is that it en-
hances workforce mobility and facilitates cultural and political integra-
tion Sometimes this form of integration comes before economic
integration.
30. See generally Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., MERCOSUR: The Common Market of
the Twenty-First Century?, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2005).
31. See Deise de Oliveira, Acordo Mercosul-Unido Europjia Depende de Desfecho de
Doha [MERCOSUR-EU Agreement depends on the DOHA Outcome], FOLHA
ONLINE, (September 14, 2007), available at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/
dinheiro/ult9l u328605.shtml
32. See CAN Intensifies Preparations for the Third Round of CAN-EU Negotiations,
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/press/press/press-releases.htm
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B. OTHER STREAMS OF THE INTEGRATION PROGRESS
Due to a number of circumstances, most of them already mentioned,
FTAA and WTO froze negotiations. But what about MERCOSUR?
Actually, MERCOSUR and CAN have not been developing as expected.
If one examines the internal trade by economic block in 2000, the picture
is this: Asia - 68 percent; EU - 60 percent; NAFTA - 50 percent;
MERCOSUR - 22 percent; and, CAN - 10 percent. 33 This means that in
terms of internal trade, which indicates the trade integration index,
MERCOSUR is surpassed by all the other blocks, except for CAN.
MERCOSUR internal trade, however, tends to increase faster than trade
with third countries. 34
I think MERCOSUR is now paving the roads previously opened, yet
they are still uneven. MERCOSUR is beginning the next step by discuss-
ing political and cultural issues, the passport and the MERCOSUR Par-
liament that was established in December 2006 are signs of this phase.35
There are others also, as it was put by Robert A. Pastor:
Perhaps because of the region's closer ties to Europe, MERCOSUR
defined itself in terms that went beyond just economic cooperation.
They agreed to develop together regional infrastructure in transport,
energy, and telecommunications. And in 1998, the four countries
signed a Declaration on Workers' Rights and a separate agreement
to support democracy, human rights, and a "peace zone." The
MERCOSUR countries have also negotiated associate membership
with Bolivia and Chile, and are consulting with the Andean Commu-
nity. Although MERCOSUR has been tested by the financial crisis
in Brazil and rising unemployment in Argentina, it has continued to
expand and deepen economic cooperation. The member govern-
ments have reached a sectoral agreement on automotive trade, and
they are negotiating ways to harmonize immigration policies (though
a MERCOSUR passport and greater workforce mobility), financial
statements and statistics, and macroeconomic coordination. Most im-
portant has been MERCOSUR'S extraordinary growth of intrare-
gional trade - averaging 19 percent a year during the 1990s, almost
three times higher than the rate of growth of their world trade.36
The MERCOSUR Parliament has started to discuss a large array of
issues, pushing into the agenda themes such as visa fees exemption, cattle
33. Source: WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2002. October 2000 data.
Analysis BAH-Global Development Finance Online-The Economist Intelligence
Unit.
34. PASTOR, supra note 21, p. 174.
35. The MERCOSUR Parliament initially consisted of eighteen congressional repre-
sentatives from each of the five countries. In the second phase, due to begin in
2010, the representatives will be directly elected by secret ballot. The
MERCOSUR Parliament is deemed to contribute to the consolidation of South
American integration and to improve regional cooperation. It will also work to
establish mechanisms to facilitate the incorporation of MECOSUR norms into the
laws of the five member states, http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/
indexl.asp#.
36. PASTOR, supra note 21, p. 174.
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diseases (a common problem to MERCOSUR countries), energy produc-
tion and distribution and, of course, issues relating to the formation of a
customs union zone, toward a common market.
Brazil has also been forced to finance the poor countries of the block to
decrease economic discrepancies between the member countries. But it
is very difficult, from a political point of view, to convince Brazilian tax-
payers to pay higher taxes to finance the development of other countries,
as has happened in Europe.
There is also an ongoing process to link the South American logistical
infrastructure through the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infra-
structure in South America (IIRSA). The IIRSA was adopted at a Meet-
ing of South American Presidents held in Brasilia, in August 2000. At
that meeting, regional leaders agreed to take joint actions to increase
South American political, social, and economic integration, including the
streamlining of regional infrastructure. This demands precise measures
to promote integration and development of isolated sub-regions. 37
Also worth mentioning, is the so-called project "Red de Mercoci-
udades", which can be literally translated as "Mercocities Net". 38 This is
a network of cities within the MERCOSUR region that will develop joint
projects, joint solutions to common problems by sharing experiences, and
foster development through the process of integration. 39
Another relevant factor is that despite the fact that trade negotiations
between MERCOSUR and EU did not develop quite well, the political
and technical cooperation regarding public policies did develop. 40 This
37. "The IIRSA Initiative encompasses all twelve South American countries. In order
to achieve the proposed multisectoral objectives, it envisages coordination mecha-
nisms and exchange of information among Governments, three of the region's
multilateral financial institutions (the Inter-American Development Bank -IDB-,
the Corporaci6n Andina de Fomento -CAF- and the Financial Fund for the Devel-
opment of the River Plate Basin -FONPLATA-)." See information on IIRSA,
http://www.iirsa.org/acercadeiirsa-ENG.asp?Codldioma=ENG (last visited Feb.
12, 2008).
38. "Mercociudades" and "Mercocities" are neologisms, new words derived from
"Mercosur + ciudades" (in Spanish) and "Mercosur + cities" (in English). It is
similar to European action of "Eurocities." For general information on Mercoci-
udades see http://www.mercociudades.org, and Eurocities; see http://
www.eurocities.org.
39. The Mercociudades Net was formed in 1995 and congregates 198 cities from Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. For a de-
tailed and technical approach to this topic see Carlos Nahuel Oddone, LA RED DE
MERCOCIUDADES: GLOBALIZACION, INTEGRACION REGIONAL Y DESARROLLO
LOCAL (Instituto de Iberoamerica y el MediterrAneo, 2008).
40. As it was put by Robert A. Pastor:
These negotiations appear thus far headed to a mutually agreeable con-
clusion. As noted above, as part of its relationship with the EU,
MERCOSUR has thus far received substantial amounts of financial as-
sistance meant to be used for the development of its institutions. This
financing, and the substantial "technical assistance" provided by the EU
and its institutions to date, could substantially change the organization
and operation of MERCOSUR's institutions in the future. Furthermore,
a successful completion of these negotiations could mean a highly advan-
tageous entry for MERCOSUR goods into the European market, a state
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may be an initial first step to ensure that in the future trade negotiations
will follow.
VII. WHAT IS NEXT?
The next phase, especially for MERCOSUR, is to foster economic inte-
gration. This is one of the reasons Venezuela is attempting to become a
full member of MERCOSUR. The FTAA will not move ahead if the
United States does not rescind subsidies or does not give affirmative signs
that it will for developing countries when discussing services at the WTO.
In other words: the DOHA Round is blocking the countries' negotiations
with regards to FTAA and MERCOSUR.
The Europeans have a persistent policy of attempting to demonstrate
to Latin America that public policies toward social cohesion are better
than leaving society alone to be controlled by the ancient (and blind)
invisible hands of the market, 41 as epitomized by the Washington Con-
sensus policies. This point of view would push Latin American countries
to a more EU-like style of distributive policies.
Another example of these new trends is Brazil's threat to cross-retali-
ate regarding the upland cotton subsidies adopted by the U.S. Govern-
ment. These subsidies have been deemed to be illegal and have affected
Brazilian cotton exports, according to a WTO decision. Now, Brazil will
request WTO authorization to apply cross-retaliation to U.S. exports to
Brazil, if the United States does not implement the WTO ruling.
42
In 2005, after Brazil won the cotton case against the United States,
43 it
formally requested the right to retaliate against U.S. patents, copyrights,
of affairs that could make MERCOSUR far more attractive to other po-
tential members and which could result in more potential applications
for membership. This situation could place MERCOSUR in a similar di-
lemma to that faced by the EU until recently: how to substantially in-
crease the size and membership of the organization without sacrificing its
effectiveness and efficiency.
PASTOR, supra note 36, at 39.
41. The European Commission has pointed out that: "[t]he Vienna Summit [2006]
confirmed the two priority themes at the core of discussions: regional integration
and SOCIAL COHESION in Latin America" and "[a]t the Guadalajara Summit in
May 2004, the Heads of Government of the EU and the Latin American countries
committed themselves to placing promotion of SOCIAL COHESION at the centre of
their biregional relations. The EC and Brazil agreed to initiate a sectoral dia-
logue." See European Commission, Brazil: Country Strategic Paper 2007-2013, El
2007/889, 5, 19 (May 14, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
externalrelations/brazil/csp/07 13 en.pdf. By promoting social cohesion EU in-
tends to oppose Washington Consensus policies that as aforementioned did not
promote wealth and income distribution.
42. See LEANDRO FORTES, Urn Teste Inddito, Para Alm da Rodada Doha [An Un-
precedented Test: Beyond the Doha Round], Carta Capital, SEPT. 12, 2007, AT 26-
27 (BRAZ.), available at http://www.sindag.com.br/noticia.php?NEwSID=402.
43. See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through
Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dis-
pute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 153, 176 (2007) (referring to
the Panel Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept.
8, 2004); and the Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cot-
ton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005)).
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and services providers, and further suspended cross-retaliation request
against the United States.44 In line with this position, there is a proposed
bill in the Brazilian Congress that, if adopted, will widen the scope of the
breaking of patents on drugs for AIDS treatment-which has been a par-
adigmatic issue since the beginning of the Doha Round. The bill states in
its first clause that the law will establish procedures for the adoption of
measures relating to the suspension, weakening, and extinction of prop-
erty rights in the Brazilian territory when a foreign country does not ac-
complish multilateral obligations according to the WTO. 45
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The facts that have been discussed here explain why MERCOSUR,
CAN, and FTAA are not working together to acquire a common destiny,
while MERCOSUR is still in evolving.
Despite all the deterrence factors presented in this paper that would
halt MERCOSUR development (in the sense of economic integration),
there are economic and non-economic factors that are pushing the region
to a position where economic and trade integration will be easier in the
future. When economic and trade integration will be accomplished, how-
ever, is a question yet to be answered.
The facts and analysis aforementioned also explain why the adoption of
the Washington Consensus recommendations diversified political power
with the Latin American region allowing left-wing parties to take control
in the most important Latin American countries. Moreover, the adoption
of the recommendations also had an economic impact on the region'
economies. One of the consequences of these changes was to make
FTAA negotiations akin to those of the WTO, resulting in similar
agendas.
44. See Brazil Asks for Cross-Retaliation Under TRIPS, GATS in Cotton Dispute with
U.S., 9 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (Issue no. 34), Oct. 12, 2005, at 5-6,
available at http://www.ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/7349; see also Brazil Sus-
pends Cross-Retaliation Request Against U.S. in Cotton Case, 9 BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG. (Issue no. 40), Nov. 23, 2005, available at http://www.ictsd.net/i/
news/bridgesweekly/7363.
45. Law Bill No. 1893/2007, (introduced by Representative Paulo Teixeira), available
at http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/integras/497234.pdf.
